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Abstract
In the postal sector, the financial burden of the universal service depends on its content, the
postal market characteristics and the country’s geographical configuration. These three groups of
factors affect both the direct cost of providing the service and the extent of competition on the
market. In this paper, we consider countries with different geographical characteristics and we
show that the choice of an appropriate mechanism to share the burden of universal service
between market participants depends on the country configuration. Thus, for universal service
financing, one size does not fit all.
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1. Introduction 
 
In the European Union, Full Market Opening (FMO) of postal markets is now 
scheduled for 2011.  FMO allows competitors of the incumbent postal operator to 
enter all the segments of the postal markets including mail delivery.  At the same 
time, high standards for the universal service (daily collection and delivery, 
nationwide coverage, affordable tariffs) are maintained.  In a liberalized postal 
market, competition may be a threat for the financing of the universal service.  
Indeed, new postal firms that are not subject to any universal service constraint 
will compete for the most profitable market segments, leaving the less profitable 
ones to the universal service provider, a phenomenon known as cream-skimming.  
This is currently the case in the European countries that already experienced FMO 
(and a substantial level of competition): new postal companies target the most 
profitable products (non-urgent bulk mail, for instance) and deliver mail in the 
most densely populated regions only, leaving the sparsely populated regions to the 
historical operator.   FMO is thus a threat for the financial viability of the 
universal service provider (hereafter USP). And in a competitive market, the USP 
might be unable to maintain the same level of service. 
Fulfilling universal service obligations (hereafter USO) is usually costly 
for the firm in charge.  The cost of complying with the USO depends on three 
groups of factors: the definition of universal service (and, incidentally, its 
measurement), the postal market characteristics and the country’s geographical 
configuration.  Universal postal service is usually defined along three lines: the 
scope of products, the quality in its multiple aspects and the price constraints on 
universal service products.  The precise content of these obligations differs 
substantially across countries (Ambrosini et al., 2006) and the cost of complying 
with the obligations depends on their definition.   Postal market characteristics, 
such as the mailing volume per inhabitant, the composition of the mail stream, the 
efficiency and the productivity of the historical operator, as well as the country’s 
geographical characteristics such as the population density, the grouping index, 
the country’s hilliness have an impact on the cost of handling and delivering mail 
and thereby on the profit of the USP.   
These three groups of factors have a twofold impact on the cost of 
providing the universal service.  They have a direct impact on the cost of 
producing the service and an indirect impact as they affect the extent of 
competition on the market.  Valletti et al. (2002) show that the nature of price 
competition and the extent of coverage by incoming firms are altered by the 
imposition of coverage and/or uniform price constraints.  Bloch and Gautier 
(2008) show that the efficiency of the USP determines the mode of delivery 
(access or bypass) adopted by competing postal operators.  d’Alcantara and 
Gautier (2008) show that the countries’ geographical characteristics have a major 
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impact on the entrant’s scale of operations and on the profits of the historical 
operator.   Thus the ability of the USP to finance the universal postal service in a 
liberalized environment depends on the definition of USO, the market, and the 
geographical characteristics.  Heterogeneous countries are hence likely to be in 
different situations regarding the sustainability of the USO after FMO 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2006).  
Universal service may be non-sustainable in a liberalized environment.  
Moreover, even if universal service is sustainable, its financial burden may place 
the USP at a competitive disadvantage.  For that reason, according to the third 
postal directive, whenever universal service obligations represent an unfair 
financial burden for its provider, the national regulator may introduce a 
compensation mechanism.  The postal directive leaves two options to regulators: 
public compensation and cost-sharing between service providers.  In this paper, 
we concentrate on the second option only.  The idea is to create a universal 
service fund dedicated to the financing of the USO.  This fund is fed by 
contributions from all market participants.  In this paper, the tax is fixed at a level 
that guarantees a sustainable universal service in a competitive environment.1  
Regulator must choose an appropriate tax base to finance the universal 
service fund.    The choice of tax instrument and tax level has an impact on 
market prices, profits, the extent of competition and welfare (Anderson et al., 
2001, Choné et al., 2002, Borsenberger et al., 2010, Jaag and Trinkner, 2010).  In 
this paper, we compare a series of tax instruments including an output tax, a 
revenue tax, an entry fee, a tax on covered routes and a pay-or-play.  These USO 
funding mechanisms (and the USO themselves) are not ‘competitively neutral’ as 
they affect the way firms compete on the market.  With a USO funding 
mechanism, competitors’ behavior might be modified in three different ways.  The 
tax can induce (1) a change in the entrant’s market behavior (2) a change in the 
entrant’s scale of operations and (3) a change in the firm’s entry decision.   A 
change in the market behavior of the competitors can be either an induced change 
in the price reaction of the entrant in response to a fund collection scheme or a 
change in the bundle of products offered.  Secondly, due to the funding 
mechanism, the operating scale of the competitors may change.  Some routes, 
services or products, profitable before the imposition of a compensation 
mechanism may no longer be profitable afterwards.   Or, under a pay-or-play 
mechanism, an operator may extend its operation if the play option turns out to be 
more profitable than the pay option.   Note that the extent of entry has a second-
order effect on the price charged by the firms, especially when a uniform pricing 
																																																								
1 According to Boldron et al. (2009), “the burden (of the USO) is unfair if the USP’s market power 
is not sufficient to counterbalance the weight of the USO to maintain a reasonable profit and is 
financially unsustainable if the USP incurs losses.”  
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	constraint applies.  In this case, larger market coverage triggers a more aggressive 
price reaction by the incumbent.  Lastly, the funding mechanism may act as a 
barrier to entry and it may deter competitors from entering the market.  In Finland 
for instance, the licensing requirements include a turnover tax for the operators 
that do not serve sparsely populated regions and it is considered as one of the 
main entry barriers.  Currently, despite FMO, the historical operator still enjoys a 
monopoly position on the letter market.    
The distortions induced by these taxes are not equivalent and different 
taxes lead to different market outcomes.  In this paper we consider three 
hypothetical countries with heterogeneous geographical characteristics (as in 
d’Alcantara and Gautier, 2008) and we compare, for each country, the market 
outcome with the different tax instruments.  We consider three countries that 
differ according to the amount of cross-subsidies in the pre-FMO monopoly 
situation.  To be more precise, we consider: 
 
 a “dual” country with two distinct regions, a large profitable urban region 
and a large unprofitable rural one;  
 an “homogenous” country where a majority of the addresses are located in 
a fairly urbanized region;  
 an intermediate “monotone” configuration.   
 
The estimated market outcomes after FMO differ sharply in these three countries, 
with substantial differences in market coverage, for instance.  This echoes the 
observed differences across European postal markets, where alternative end-to-
end operators have nationwide coverage in The Netherland but cover only 40% of 
the addresses in Sweden, mainly the largest agglomerations.     
The USO financing issue is a well-known story in theory but a very 
complex issue in practice.  In this paper, we use a series of calibrated numerical 
examples to compare the various tax instruments.  Our objectives are multiple.  
Firstly, we would like to estimate the distortions in prices and market coverage 
induced by the taxes.  As we show in the paper, different taxes lead to 
substantially different market outcomes making the choice of an appropriate tax 
base sensitive.  Second, our numerical simulations aim at deriving plausible 
values for the different taxes in the three country configurations.   This is 
particularly interesting because a tax estimation based on a computation of the net 
cost of USO is likely to be misleading if it fails to recognize the distortionary 
effect of the tax.2  For instance, if the cost estimate is based on a market scenario 
where an entrant covers half of the addresses and, after a tax is imposed, the 
entrant decreases substantially its coverage, the initial cost estimate is likely to be 
																																																								
2 Jaag et al. (2009), Gautier and Wauthy (2010b). 
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wrong.   And compensation for the USP based on this estimated cost is 
inappropriate because the USO costing exercise is endogenous to its funding.3 
Finally, we would like to shed light on the question of the most appropriate tax 
instrument. As the title of the paper suggests, we find that the optimal tax 
instrument depends on the country configuration and thus one size does not fit all.   
 
2. The model 
 
2.1 The base model  
 
We consider three different countries with an identical population of N 
households.  Households have a homogenous size and countries differ with 
respect to the distribution of households on their territory (see after).   
 
In each country, there are two postal firms, the historical operator, firm I, and an 
entrant, firm E.  As part of the USO, the incumbent operator must deliver mail 
nationwide at least five working days a week.  There are no universal service 
constraints imposed on the entrant, who may then deliver mail less frequently 
only to part of the national territory.  As results, products are not homogenous and 
firms have different cost structures.   
 
The number of mailing items send to a household x depends on mail prices and on 
the bundle of products offered at x i.e., whether or not the entrant delivers mail at 
x.  When the entrant covers x, the net utility a representative sender gets from 
mailing to x is given by:  






 dqiqe  piqi  peqe  
where qi, qe are the number of mails sent to x and pi, pe, their respective stamp 
prices.  Duopoly demand functions, qi
D ( pi, pe )  and qe
D ( pi, pe ) , are derived from 
the consumer’s net utility maximization problem.  When x is not covered by the 
entrant, the net utility of a representative sender is U(qi,0) and utility 
maximization gives the (monopoly) demand function, qi
M ( pi) , for the incumbent. 
The postal value chain consists of several activities.  For each firm, we 
distinguish the upstream (collection and transport) and downstream (sorting and 
delivery) activities and we decompose the total cost between these two tasks.  
Because of the universal service, firms have a different cost structure. Panzar 
(1991) and de Bijl et al. (2006) among others argue that, unlike other network 
industries, a postal delivery network requires little sunk costs, since the main costs 
are workers, vehicles and buildings.  Therefore, we consider that all the long run 
																																																								
3 Boldron et al. (2009). 
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	costs of the entrant are variable.   Things are different for the incumbent because 
of the universal service obligations usually imposed.  If the incumbent must 
deliver nationwide with a given frequency (five or six times a week) and/or 
maintain services (delivery, post offices) in remote areas, this can generate 
substantial fixed costs, even in the long run.  
The per-unit upstream costs, denoted ci for the incumbent and ce for the 
entrant, are constant, reflecting the fact that these activities are operated under 
constant returns to scale.  The structure of the downstream (or delivery) cost 
differs among firms.  For the incumbent, delivery at x involves two kind of costs: 
a fixed cost F(x) per address and a constant cost per item di, which is, unlike the 
fixed cost, independent of the receiver’s location. The fixed cost in the delivery 
activity results from the imposition of universal service obligations on the 
incumbent.  The fixed cost per location depends on the characteristics of the 
receiver’s location.  Two main drivers of this cost are the grouping index (the 
number of delivery points per stop points) and the population density (Roy, 1999).  
These factors influence both the optimal delivery mode (pedestrian, bike or 
motorized) and the cost of delivery for each mode.   
 For the entrant, there is no fixed cost in delivery.  The per-unit downstream 
cost is denoted by de(x) and it depends on the receiver’s location. Panzar (1991) 
and de Bijl et al. (2006) document significant economies of scale in the delivery 
activity.  By taking a constant delivery cost for the entrant, we implicitly assume 
that the entrant manages to capture a sufficiently large fraction of the mail stream 
to exploit these economies of scales.  The entrant can exhaust the economies of 
scale by delivering larger volumes at a lower frequency.  
Addresses x are ranked according to their delivery cost and these costs 
depend on the geographical characteristics at x (grouping index, population 
density, hilliness).  Thus, the ranking of addresses according to their cost is 
identical for the two firms: F(x) /x  0 and de(x) /x  0.  Later, we will make 
a stronger assumption and presume that the shape of the two functions F(x) and 
de(x) is identical.  Since households are identical except for their delivery cost, the 
entrant who is not bounded to nationwide coverage will serve the lowest cost 
households first.  Let us denote by ne, the index of the last covered household.  
The whole set of addresses decomposes into a subset [0,ne] of contested addresses 
and a subset [ne, N] of insulated addresses where the historical operator remains 
as a monopolist.    
When the entrant delivers to a subset ne of the population, the profits of the 
incumbent and the entrant are respectively:  
 i( pi, pe )  ne ( pi  ci  di)qiD  (N  ne )( pi  ci  di)qiM  F ( )d0
N , 
 e ( pi, pe )  (pe  ce  de ( ))qeDd0
ne . 
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The first term in Πi is the profit made by the incumbent on the ne contested 
addresses; the second term is the profit made on the remaining (N-ne) isolated 
addresses and the last term is the fixed cost associated with a daily nationwide 
delivery.   
The entrant’s average delivery cost ACe is equal to de ( )d0
ne /ne  and the 
entrant’s profit can be expressed as:  
e ( pi, pe )  ne ( pe  ce  ACe )qeD . 
Firms compete in prices.  We suppose that, in a liberalized market, the historical 
operator is freed from price regulation except for the uniform price constraint that 
may still be imposed.  The incumbent thus serves all the addresses at a uniform 
price pi but the price level is not constrained.4  The entrant serves only the 
addresses that are profitable at current market prices.  Given that the entrant has a 
unit delivery cost that depends on the receiver’s location, profit maximization 
calls for a different price for each address.  Such a pricing behavior would make 
the entrant’s tariff quite opaque and might be difficult to implement.  Moreover, 
using a location-dependent stamp price would make the model complex to solve.  
For these reasons, we consider that the entrant applies a unique stamp price to the 
whole set of addresses it serves.5,6  There are thus only two prices, pi and pe and 
no firm can discriminate among locations.  
In the base market scenario with USO, we consider the following timing 
of the events:  
 
1. The incumbent sets its price pi 
2. The entrant set its price pe and decides on its market coverage ne.   
 
The entrant’s price and coverage are given by:  
e ( pi)  argmax
pe
 e (pi, pe ), 
ne ( pi)  argmax
ne
 e (pi, pe ). 
The optimal prices (pi
*, pe
*) solve  
pi
*  argmax 
pi
 i(pi,e ), pe*  e (pi*). 
																																																								
4 In other words, market opening is a substitute to price regulation that eventually prevailed before 
FMO.  
5 As for the incumbent, the imposition of a uniform price constraint alters the entrant’s market 
behavior, especially coverage decision (see Hoernig, 2006).   
6 For the entrant, the variation in the delivery cost across covered addresses is limited because it 
concentrates exclusively on the low-cost locations.  The uniform price assumption may then be not 
so demanding.    
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	The equilibrium is unique and prices are strategic complements.  The optimal 
market coverage is such that the entrant realizes a zero profit on the last covered 
address:7 
(pe
*  ce  de (ne*))qeD ( pi*, pe*)  0  
The effect of coverage on prices is a priori ambiguous: On the one hand, a higher 
coverage increases the entrant’s average cost, and this pushes prices upward.  On 
the other hand, a higher coverage makes the incumbent more aggressive in the 
price game and this pushes prices downward.    
 
2.2 Financing universal service 
 
In our base model, the incumbent may not be able to finance the universal service.  
This happens when optimal prices and coverage lead to Πi<0. In this case, the 
combination of universal service and competition leads to the bankruptcy of the 
universal service provider and the USO are not sustainable without a subsidizing 
mechanism. 
 
2.2.1 The financial burden of the universal service 
 
Third postal directive (2008/6/EC) details the procedures that member states must 
follow to finance the universal service:  
 
‘Where a Member State determines that the universal service obligations, as 
provided for in this Directive, entail a net cost, calculated taking into account 
Annex I, and represent an unfair financial burden on the universal service 
provider(s), it may introduce (a) a mechanism to compensate the undertaking(s) 
concerned from public funds; or (b) a mechanism for the sharing of the net cost of 
the universal service obligations between providers of services and/or users.’  
(2008/6/EC, Article 7§3).   
 
Before granting compensation for providing the universal service, it must be 
established that it entails a net cost and that it represents an unfair financial 
burden.  
The third postal directive contains guidance for how to measure the net 
cost of USO.  The recommended measure is similar to the profitability cost of 
Panzar (2000) and Cremer et al. (2000).8  According to the profitability cost 
approach, the net cost of the USO is measured as the difference between the 
																																																								
7 With sequential decisions, the entrant has no incentives to strategically limit its market coverage 
(Valletti et al., 2002).  
8 See Jaag et al. (2009) for a detailed discussion on the method for estimating the net cost of the 
USO prescribed by the third postal directive (Annex 1).   
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USP’s profit in a market scenario with competition and USO and a counterfactual 
scenario with competition but without USO (the so-called ‘unsubsidized market 
scenario’).  The net cost of the USO is thus the lost profit incurred by the USP 
specifically due to the imposition of USO independently of the liberalization 
process since in both scenarios the USP faces competition.   
Whether this estimated net cost of the USO represents an unfair burden on 
the USP is a debatable question.  For Boldron et al. (2009), several criteria of 
unfairness can be relevant, depending on the specific national situation: (i) When 
the burden exceeds a given share of USP’s profits, (ii) when it prevents the USP 
to make a “reasonable profit” defined for the postal sector or (iii) when the USP’s 
profits are obviously under proportionate compared to those of its competitors. 
The choice of an appropriate criterion for fairness is obviously crucial as it 
determines whether or not the USP is eligible for compensation and the level of 
the funding.  In the literature9, criterion (ii) has often been used.  The regulator 
must ensure that the universal service is indeed provided and that the USP collects 
a sufficient level of profit 0. A standard participation constraint with an 
exogenous outside option is thus added to the regulatory design problem.  In the 
sequel, we will follow this approach and we will further assume that the USP’s 
outside option, 0, is normalized to zero.  The regulatory environment must be 
such that the universal service is sustainable in a competitive environment.  In 
this view, the USP’s compensation need does not correspond to the estimated net 
cost of the USO.  
Finally, notice that financing the USP’s deficit is legitimate only if (i) the 
operator is efficient i.e. costs are best-practice costs10 and (ii) the USP realizes a 
non-negative profit in the unsubsidized market scenario.    
 
2.2.2 The universal service fund 
 
Different mechanisms can be used to finance USO (see Oxera, 2007 for a 
discussion related to the postal sector).  In this paper, we consider a universal 
service fund that has the following features: first, the money collected by the fund 
is integrally transferred to the universal service provider.  Second, the fund is 
financed by a uniform tax paid by all market participants and third, the tax rate is 
set at a level that guarantees a nil profit for the incumbent inclusive of the tax 
proceeds (as in Borsenberger et al., 2010).  All these assumptions imply that the 
tax does not modify the incumbent’s behavior since any amount it pays to the 
fund is integrally paid back as compensation for the universal service.  This, 
obviously, is not true for the entrant.    
																																																								
9 For instance in Crew and Kleindorfer (1998), De Donder (2006) and Borsenberger et al. (2010). 
10 Inefficiencies resulting from the imposition of the universal service obligations might still be 
tolerated.   
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	 We consider the following possible taxes:  
 
 A lump-sum entry fee.  
 An output tax on each mailing item. 
 A revenue tax, proportional to the turnover. 
 A coverage tax on each address covered by the entrant. 
 A tax on each address that the entrant does not cover.  This tax is a form of 
pay-or-play since the entrant has the choice between covering an address 
and contributing to the fund. 
 
All these taxes are uniform i.e. independent of the mail destination.   
 In the subsidized scenarios, the timing of the events is modified as 
follows:  
 
1. The regulator decides on a tax instrument. 
2. The incumbent sets its price pi. 
3. The entrant set its price pe and decides on its market coverage ne.   
4. The tax is set at level such that the incumbent profit plus the tax revenue is 
equal to zero.   
 
2.2.3 The impact of the taxes 
 
Taxes are not competitively neutral. The taxes affect the entrant’s pricing and 
coverage behavior, which, in turn, trigger a reaction by the incumbent.11  For 
greater clarity, let us consider for a while that the incumbent’s price remains the 
same.  At a given price pi, the imposition of a tax potentially has two different 
impacts on the entrant.  First, it can modify the entrant’s best reply function (
e(pi)).  Second, it can modify the number of routes where the entrant has 
decided to compete ( ne(pi)).  Table 1 lists and signs the impact on the price and 
market coverage of all possible taxes.   
 
 Entry fee Output tax Turnover tax Coverage tax Pay-or-play
Price = + + = = 
Coverage  = - - - + 
Table 1: Impact of taxes on the entrant’s price and coverage for a given pi 
																																																								
11 The universal service itself is not neutral and the imposition of obligations such as a uniform 
price constraint or a universal coverage constraint modifies the way firms compete (Valletti et al. 
2000, Gautier and Wauthy, 2010a).   
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 The revenue and the turnover taxes shift the best reply function upward, 
leading to a higher price pe.  At the same time and despite the price increase, these 
taxes reduce the profit from each covered address.  Thus, the entrant delivers mail 
to a smaller portion of the country.  Taxes on covered or on non-covered routes do 
not modify the pricing behavior -the function e  is left unchanged- but they 
respectively decrease or increase the market coverage.  An entry fee does not 
change the price nor the coverage but it can eventually modify the decision to 
compete as it may deter the firm from entering the market.  Anticipating a 
modification in its rival behavior, the incumbent adapts its price in the first place.  
Our calibrated model aims at quantifying these effects. 
 
2.2.4 Comparing tax instruments 
 
Comparing the different tax instruments is far from obvious because the break-
even tax proceeds are endogenous to the choice of a tax instrument.  For that 
reason, our comparisons are based on a numerical exercise; some preliminary 
remarks on the choice of tax instrument are made in this section.  
 Suppose that the aggregate industry profits (Πi+Πe) are positive.  In such a 
case, if the historical operator is not able to cover all its cost (Πi<0), a lump-sum 
transfer from the entrant can be used to sustain the USO.  An entry fee equal to -
Πi is compatible with competition on the market and does not affect the entrant’s 
behavior who keeps the same price and maintains the same coverage.  When this 
tax instrument is available, it is likely to be optimal.12  
 When aggregate profits are negative, a lump-sum fee equal to the 
incumbent’s losses would act as an entry barrier.  The entrant would no longer be 
able to have positive after-tax profits and, therefore, it refuses to compete with the 
historical operator.  A distortionary tax is then a necessary condition for a 
sustainable USO.   
A distortive tax finances the USO through two different channels: firstly, 
the tax is an additional source of income for the USP.  Secondly, the tax reduces 
competition on the market: price competition is less fierce and/or the entrant has a 
lower coverage13 (cfr. Table 1) and, thereby, the incumbent’s profit increases.  
Hence, the total revenue for the incumbent (profit + tax revenue) increases with 
the level of the tax.  The regulator must choose the tax level that leaves a zero 
profit to the USP.  However, such a tax may not be compatible with competition 
on the market.  Indeed, a higher tax means that the entrant’s profit decreases and it 
																																																								
12 For Mirabel et al. (2009) using a non-neutral instrument is recommended since it can 
countervail the inefficiencies created by the universal service.  
13 Except for the pay-or-play that, incidentally, intensifies competition.  For that reason, the pay-
or-play (as we have defined it) is probably not an appropriate option for the postal sector. 
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	is not always possible to find a distortionary tax such that aggregate industry 
profits are positive.   For that reason, the most distortionary tax instruments (on 
the output and the revenue) should not be dismissed a priori.  Indeed, these might 
be the only taxes compatible with competition on the market and universal service 
provision.   
The comparison between output and revenue taxes has a long tradition in 
public economics.  Anderson et al. (2001) show that unit taxation can be more 
efficient than ad-valorem taxation under Bertrand competition with differentiated 
products when the aggregate demand is sufficiently inelastic and firms produce at 
different costs, two assumptions that we made in this paper.  In a related paper, 
Borsenberger et al. (2010) study the issue of the appropriate tax base.  They 
compare ad-valorem and output taxes and find that the latter dominates the former 
when the tax rate is uniform (applied equally to all products and operators).  With 
a uniform tax, the universal service product (the single-piece letter) is taxed, and, 
accordingly, the preferred tax is the one that imposes the lowest tax burden to the 
USP.  The entrant’s share of the total output is likely to be larger than its share of 
the total revenue mainly because of the specific price and mark-up structures in 
postal activity. The more contestable segment  (bulk mail) is the one with the 
lowest price (generating high volume and low revenues) but the highest mark-up, 
whereas the market with the highest price (single piece mail) is also the one with 
the lowest mark-up.  Thus the entrant’s contribution to the USO financing is 
proportionally higher with the output tax.  In line with these works, we find, in 
our numerical simulations, that ad-valorem taxes are dominated by output taxes.   
 
3. Calibrated market outcomes 
 
3.1 Calibration hypothesis 
 
We consider three hypothetical countries with an identical population of 2m 
households.  Households are identical except for the fact that they are located in 
different geographical areas with different associated delivery costs.    
We use the following parameters to calibrate the demand functions: (1) At 
a price of 0.40€, the mail demand faced by a monopoly incumbent is equal to 200 
items per household.  (2) The price elasticity of the monopoly demand function is 
equal to -0.2.  (3) At equal prices, 20% of the mail items to households x are 
delivered by the entrant and (4) when the entrant is 20% less expensive, this 
proportion increases to 50%.  (5) The displacement ratio is equal to 0.9.  The 
displacement ratio (Armstrong et al., 1996) measures the business stealing effect 
of the competitor on the incumbent's mailing volume.  A displacement ratio of 0.9 
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is commonly accepted for the postal sector.14  This means that 90% of the mails 
carried by the entrant are 'stolen' from the incumbent. 
We assume that pi=0.40€ is the monopoly break-even price with a volume 
per household equal to 200.  Costs and revenues at this price are both equal to 
160m€.   To calibrate the incumbent’s cost parameters ci, di and F(x), we assume 
that 70% of the total costs incurred at the monopoly break-even price are fixed.  
Thus, the variable costs per item ci+di are equal to 0.12€.  The fixed cost per-
receiver depends on its location x.  To calibrate the function F(x), we use two 
types of information: (1) the ratio between the average unit delivery cost in the 
first and the last quintile is equal to 5.  This value is in line with those estimated 
by Boldron et al. (2006).15  (2) We specify the shape of the function F(x) and we 
consider that it differs across countries.  For each country, the total fixed cost is 
equal to 112 m€ but the distribution of this cost along the country differs.  
In country 1, the homogenous configuration, 60% of the addresses are 
located in a fairly urbanized region with a fixed cost per address equal to 56€ per 
year.  In country 2, the monotone configuration, the fixed cost per address is 
monotonically increasing from 22.4€ per year in the first quintile to 112€ in the 
last quintile.  In country 3, the dual configuration, there is a large urban region 
(40% of the country) and a large rural region (40% of the country) and fixed 
delivery costs are respectively equal to 22.4€ and 112€.  Figure 1 represents the 
fixed cost per household in the three hypothetical countries we consider. 
The total fixed cost (the area below the curves in figure 1) is identical for 
all three configurations and only its distribution among addresses differs.  Thus, 
the monopoly solution under uniform price and universal coverage constraints is 
identical.  The only difference is the relative importance of cross-subsidies.  At the 
break-even price of 0.40€, the loss-making addresses that the firm must serve as 
part of the USO account for a deficit of 14.9m€, 23.3m€ and 33.5m€ in the 
homogenous, monotone and dual configuration compensated by an equivalent 
profit realized on the profitable addresses.   
 
																																																								
14 De Donder et al. (2006).   
15 They estimate a ratio of 3.1 for UK & Wales, 4.3 for France, 4.4 for Germany, 4.9 for Italy and 
7.7 for Spain.   
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Figure 1: The three country configurations 
 
Last, we must parameterize the entrant’s cost function. We assume that the 
entrant’s unit cost of handling a unit of mail to x is 20% lower than the average 
unit cost of an incumbent monopolist.  The entrant’s cost is thus 
ce+de(x)=0.8[ci+di+F(x)/200] and this cost has the same shape as F(x), 
represented on figure 1.   
The entrant’s cost is computed on the basis of the monopolist’s average 
cost at x but the actual cost differential will be larger than 20%.  Indeed, consider 
a location x where the incumbent’s average cost is equal to 0.40€ before market 
opening.  The entrant’s cost of delivering a unit of mail to x is 20% lower that is 
to say 0.32€.  Now suppose that the incumbent looses half of the mail stream to x, 
its actual average cost increases to 0.68€ because of the fixed cost.   In this case, 
the entrant is 53% cheaper than the incumbent for delivery at x. 
Our model is thus calibrated to give a large cost advantage to the entrant.  
The entrant can create such an advantage by offering low cost products (less 





16 Heitzler and Wei (2010) document that, in (former West) Germany, the delivery staff’s hourly 
wage (7.71€) paid by the competitors (before the introduction of the minimum wage legislation) is 
37% lower than the corresponding wage paid by the incumbent (12.13€). 
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3.2 Calibrated results 
 
3.2.1 The profitability net cost of the USO 
 
In this section, we present our numerical simulations.  For each country, our 
starting point consists of two market scenarios: (1) a scenario with competition 
but without USO, the ‘unsubsidized market scenario’ and (2) a scenario with 
competition and universal service obligations (uniform price + universal 
coverage) imposed on the incumbent but without universal service financing.  To 
avoid additional assumptions on the incumbent’s cost structure and the degree of 
product differentiation, we consider that the products offered by the firms are 
identical in all the market scenarios.  These two market outcomes illustrate that 
countries, that were identical before FMO (same break-even price, same welfare), 
are no longer identical after market liberalization.  In particular, the market 
penetration of the entrant varies considerably across countries (as in d’Alcantara 
and Gautier, 2008) with consequences on the firms’ profitability and the USO 
funding.  
 
 Homogenous Monotone Dual 
ne 20% 35% 46% 
ni 87% 78% 57% 
pi (€) 0.43-0.76 0.28-0.76 0.32-0.76
pe (€) 0.32 0.27 0.27 
Πi (m€) 34.5 17.8 10.9 
Πe (m€) 7.9 2.8 7.1 
 
Table 2: Unsubsidized market scenario: competition, no USO  
 
Table 2 reports summary results for the scenario without USO.  In this 
case, firm I can price discriminate between contested and non-contested routes.  
On the latter it applies the monopoly price of 0.76€.  On the former, standard 
price competition takes place.  When the incumbent is relieved from the USO, it 
serves only the profitable addresses (ni).  13% of the addresses in the 
homogeneous country, 22% in the monotone country and 43% in the dual country 
are not profitable even for a monopolist.  Competition is limited to the low-cost 
addresses and thus the country configuration is a key determinant of the degree of 
competition.  Competition is rather limited in the homogenous country and 
intense in the dual one.17   
 
																																																								
17 When competition is limited, the regulator may impose some form of price regulation.  
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	Table 3 reports summary results for our base market scenario with 
competition and USO.  In this case, firm I must have nationwide coverage and it 
can no longer price discriminate.  The most noticeable effects are the sharp drop 
in the incumbent’s profit and the large increase in the entrant’s profit.  The 
magnitude of these two related effects depends on the importance of the pre-FMO 
internal cross-subsidies.  More room for cream-skimming implies both higher 
profits for the entrant and larger losses for the incumbent.  Detailed results for this 
scenario are available in Tables 6 to 8 (column 1).  Notice that, except in the 
homogenous case, uniform pricing stimulates market expansion by the entrant i.e. 
both firms increase their market coverage under USO.     
 
 Homogenous Monotone    Dual  
ne 20% 58% 50% 
pi (€) 0.43 0.42 0.44 
pe (€) 0.32 0.34 0.33 
Πi (m€) -5.5 -24.2 -26.4 
Πe (m€) 7.9 12.1 19.2 
 
Table 3: Base scenario: competition and USO  
 
The difference in the incumbent’s profit between these two market 
scenarios is the net cost of the USO according to the profitability cost approach 
(Panzar, 2000 and Cremer et al., 2000).   
 
Homogenous  Monotone    Dual        
 40m€  42m€            37.3m€    
 
Table 4: The net cost of USO 
 
In parallel with the net cost of the USO for the incumbent, it should be 
noticed that the imposition of USO leads to a more favorable market outcome for 
the incumbent.  The following table reports the profit increase for the entrant 
compared to the no-USO scenario.  Imposing universal coverage and uniform 
price constraints hurts the incumbent but benefits to the entrant.   In this respect, it 
is legitimate that the entrant contributes to the financing of the universal service.    
 
Homogenous  Monotone    Dual        
 0€  9.3m€            12.1m€    
 
Table 5: Increase in the entrant’s profit due to USO 
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In our simulations, the USP’s compensation is not based on such an 
estimated cost of the USO.   As it can be seen in tables 7 and 8, the entrant’s 
market coverage changes relative to the base scenario when the regulator imposes 
a tax.  Thus, the net cost of the USO is estimated on the basis of a market scenario 
that is no longer relevant when the USO is funded.18  For that reason, our USO 
funding exercise does not rely on an estimated cost of the USO.  Rather, the USO 
funding must guarantee a sufficient profit level to the USP, normalized to zero in 
our numerical exercises.    
 
3.2.2 Financing a sustainable USO  
 
As it is clearly stated in table 3, the universal service cannot be sustained without 
a subsidizing scheme.  We calibrate the market outcomes with four different tax 
instruments: an entry fee, a coverage tax, an output tax and a revenue tax.  The 
pay-or-play option that stimulates market expansion and thus further deteriorates 
aggregate profits is never a feasible option in this model.  Likewise, the lump-sum 
entry fee that requires positive aggregate profits is neither a feasible option in the 
monotone and the dual configurations. Indeed, when the losses made by the 
universal service provider exceed the benefits made by the entrant, an entry fee is 
incompatible with competition on the market i.e. either the entry fee deters entry 
or it is not enough to finance the USO.  When aggregate profits are negative, the 
regulator must use a distortive tax to subsidize the USP.  Hence, competitively 
neutral financing is a myth when the burden of the USO is shared among market 
participants. 
As an alternative to the universal service fund, we consider a market 
scenario where the USO no longer includes the uniform price constraint.  In this 
case, the incumbent sets two prices: one for the contested addresses and one for 
the monopolized addresses.  Eventually, we consider that the monopoly price is 
regulated and set at its lowest possible level compatible with a non-negative 
profit.  In this latter case, competition and price regulation coexist in a liberalized 




18 See Jaag et al. (2009), Boldron et al. (2009) and Gautier and Wauthy (2010b) for discussions on 
the endogenous cost of the USO.   
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	3.2.3 The ‘homogenous’ country 
 
 Base scenario Output tax Revenue tax Coverage tax Non-uniform 
price 
Market coverage 












Prices (€)      




0.32 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.32 
Mail volume 
(per address) 
     
 193 189 187 187 128 (187*) 
 73 69 61 56 73 
 
 
133 133 141 145 133 
Net profits (m€)      
Πi -5.5 0 0 0 28.2(0*) 
Πe 
 
7.9 7.9 8.4 8.7 7.9 
Welfare (m€) 
 
192 189 188 187 142 
(189*) 
Tax rate / 0.02€  5%  2€  / 
Tax paid by E 
(m€) 
 1.06 0.95 0.8  
      
* Regulated price 
Table 6: Homogeneous country  
 
In the homogenous country, 60% of the households are located in a fairly 
urbanized region (the ‘homogeneous’ region) and, in the pre-FMO scenario, the 
incumbent just breaks even on these addresses.  In a liberalized market, the 
entrant will either cover the whole set of addresses in the homogeneous region or 
none of them.   The incumbent has thus two strategies; either it allows large-scale 
entry and the entrant’s coverage is above 80% or it uses a limit price to deter entry 
in the homogeneous region.  It turns out that this latter strategy is the most 
profitable for the incumbent who maximizes its profit (or in this case, minimizes 
its losses) with a limit price.  The incumbent’s profit maximizing price is thus a 
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on each address in the homogeneous region. When the regulator imposes a tax, 
the incumbent firm continues to use a limit price and the tax has no impact on 
market coverage.19  
The four tax instruments are available to the regulator.  Universal service 
can be financed with a 5.5m€ entry fee, a 0.02€ tax on each unit of mail, a 5% tax 
on revenue or a 2€ tax on each address covered by the entrant.  In the 
homogenous country, the lump-sum tax dominates the other available options 
because any distortive tax leads to higher prices for both firms.  Note that, due to 
the limited elasticity of demand, most of the tax is passed to consumers.  For 
instance, in the case of the output tax, the entrant’s price increase is almost equal 
to the tax and the incumbent can deter entry in the homogeneous region with a 
higher price.    
Instead of a universal service fund, the regulator can relax the universal 
service obligations.  Without the uniform price constraint, the incumbent can 
charge a different price on the non-contested addresses that represent 80% of the 
population.  If it applies the monopoly price, it makes considerable profits.  And 
the regulator can pass this surplus to consumers by fixing a limit price.   
 
3.2.4 The ‘monotone’ country 
 
 Base scenario Output tax Revenue tax Coverage tax Non-uniform 
price 
Market coverage 












Prices (€)      




0.34 0.42 0.41 0.34 0.27 
Mail volume 
(per address) 
     
 195 183 180 187 128 (173*) 
 108 104 88 64 170 
 
 
97 88 103 137 59 
Net profits (m€)      
																																																								
19 Note that the taxes are calibrated to leave a zero profit to the incumbent.  Thus, in principle, the 
incumbent is indifferent between the large and low-scale entry.  We focus on the strategy (the limit 







Table 7:  Monotone country  
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	Πi -24.2 0 0 0 13.1 (0*) 
Πe 
 
12.1 9.0 8.7 4.3 2.8 
Welfare (m€) 
 
185 180 176 185 159 (189*) 
Tax rate / 0.087€  23.6%  13.7€  / 
Tax paid by E 
(m€) 
 8.05 9.6 7.95  
      
* Regulated price 
 
In the monotone configuration, the entrant covers 58% of the country in 
the base scenario.  In this scenario, the universal service provider is making losses 
and these losses cannot be fully compensated by a lump-sum tax since aggregate 
profits are negative.  To reach financial viability, the regulator can use an output, 
revenue or coverage tax but the market outcome varies substantially with these 
three different options.   
A sustainable output tax must be equal to 0.087€ per mail unit handled by 
the entrant and the total tax revenue accounts for 8.05m€.  Prices increase sharply 
due to the limited elasticity of the demand, but despite that, the entrant’s 
profitability per covered address declines and the entrant reduces its market 
coverage to 52% of the territory.  The revenue tax rate is equal to 23.6%, quite a 
large percentage, and the proceeds are 9.6m€.  The price differential is a bit larger 
and the entrant’s coverage down to 48% of the addresses.  The tax on covered 
addresses has a stronger impact on the market coverage.  With a 7.95€ tax on each 
household covered, the entrant delivers only to 29% of the addresses.  The 
entrant’s price is identical compared to the unsubsidized scenario while the 
incumbent’s price increases because a lower coverage makes price competition 
less fierce (Valletti et al., 2002).  The coverage tax leads to lower prices and a 
lower coverage.  Given that products are close substitutes, the coverage tax 
welfare dominates the other tax instruments.  Notice that, with all these taxes, the 
contribution of the entrant to the universal service fund is quite large relative to 
the gross profit.  The ratio between net (after tax) and gross (before tax) profit is 
0.52 with the output tax, 0.47 with the revenue tax and 0.36 with the coverage tax.  
Finally, an alternative to the universal service fund is to abandon the 
uniform price constraint.  In such a case, the incumbent has two stamp prices: one 
(=0.76€) that applies to the addresses where it remains the sole provider and 
another (=0.28€) for the lower cost addresses challenged by the entrant.  With 
non-uniform price, firms compete for 35% of the delivery routes, considerably 
less than in the unsubsidized scenario, and both firms have positive profits.  The 
Table 7, continued.
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incumbent price increases dramatically on the non-challenged routes compared to 
the pre-FMO situation but the regulator has some room for decreasing this 
monopoly price.  As a matter of fact, the lowest possible price on the non-
contested routes compatible with a non-negative profit is equal to 0.53€.  If 
competition on the contested routes and regulation on the monopolized routes are 
mixed, the welfare is equal to 1.89m€ and it is actually higher than with the 
universal service taxes. 
 
3.2.5 The ‘dual’ country 
 
The dual country has a large urban region with a low delivery cost per address and 
a large rural region with associated higher costs.  Cross-subsidies are more 
important and the selective entry of an alternative firm only on the most profitable 
routes has even more serious consequences on the incumbent’s profit.  As a matter 
of fact, the entrant has a smaller operating scale than in the monotone case (50% 
of the population is covered in the base scenario) but higher profits.  Despite that, 
a lump-sum entry fee cannot finance the incumbent’s losses.   
Higher taxes in the dual country are necessary to distort the incumbent’s 
behavior and to restrict competition.  These taxes push the prices upward but their 
effect on coverage is limited mainly because the slope of the cost functions is 
steeper than in the monotone case.   
 
 Base scenario Output tax Revenue tax Non-uniform price 
Market coverage 










Prices (€)     




0.33 0.41 0.40 0.27 
Mail volume 
(per address) 
    
 191 178 176 128 (144*) 
 74 79 60 142 
 
 
130 110 129 82 
Net profits (m€)     
Πi -26.4 0 0 1.4 (0*) 







Table 8: Dual country  
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180 176 172 163 (179*) 
Tax rate / 0.105€  30%  / 
Tax paid by E (m€)  11.3 16.8  
     
* Regulated price 
 
The sustainable output tax is set at 0.105€ per mail unit.  Its impact on 
coverage is small but not its impact on prices. The turnover tax leads to a higher 
incumbent price and a lower coverage and it is welfare dominated by the output 
tax.   
Taxes based on coverage are not feasible in this country configuration.  
Indeed suppose that the entrant covers only the lowest cost urban region (40% of 
the addresses).   In this case, optimal prices are pi=0.42€, pe=0.32€ and the 
entrant’s profit per covered address is equal to 18.8€.  Even a tax per covered 
address equal to that amount would not be sufficient to finance the incumbent’s 
19.6m€ losses.   In the dual country, the tax must distort both the price and the 
coverage.     
With non-uniform pricing, the incumbent’s profit is positive but rather 
small.  The regulator has thus little room for decreasing the price in the 
monopolized region.  The lowest possible price-cap must be set at quite a high 
level (0.67€) and more than a half of the population face a huge price increase 
after FMO.   As a matter of fact, with non-uniform pricing, the price for delivery 
in the rural region is twice as high as that of the urban zone.    
 
3.3 Welfare comparisons 
 
The different subsidizing schemes we considered have a different impact on 
prices, the extent of entry, profits and welfare.  The choice of an appropriate 
mechanism depends on the country configuration.  In table 9, we have ranked the 
various solutions for each country according to their welfare level.    
 
 Homogenous Monotone Dual 
Entry fee 1 n.a n.a 
Output tax 2 2 1 
Revenue tax 3 3 2 
Coverage tax 4 1 n.a 
 
Table 9: Taxes ranked according to the welfare 
Table 8, continued.
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There is no unanimous ranking among countries20 and the choice of an 
appropriate tax is sensitive to the geographical characteristics.  We have tried to 
capture this by considering three country configurations that differ according to 
the importance of cross-subsidies in the pre-FMO situation.  From our numerical 
exercise, it appears that a country where cross-subsidies are more important 
requires a more distortive tax to sustain the USO in a liberalized market.  In the 
homogenous country, where subsidies are limited, a lump-sum entry fee that has 
no impact on prices and coverage, is the preferred option.  In the monotone 
country, where cross-subsidies are more important, a neutral entry fee is not 
feasible and the preferred instrument is a coverage (or profit) tax that does not 
change the pricing behavior but only the extent of competition.  Finally, in the 
dual country, where cross-subsidies are the most important, only taxes that distort 
both the pricing and the coverage are feasible.   
In this model, we assume a high displacement ratio and a limited price 
elasticity, two plausible assumptions for the postal sector.  They imply that no 
market expansion is expected after FMO.21  Moreover, the cost structure is such 
that the incumbent has a high average cost but a low marginal cost while the 
entrant has a lower average cost but a higher marginal cost.  Hence, each time the 
entrant captures a fraction of the mail stream, aggregate profits will decrease 
unless the incumbent is able to compensate with higher prices.   
Competitive pressures limit the possible price increases.  Higher prices 
indeed imply lower profit on the contested addresses and larger scale entry.  In our 
estimations, the incumbent’s price increase is at most 10% higher than the pre-
FMO scenario and it is insufficient to compensate the lost profits due to entry.  
Having limited possibility for increasing its price, the incumbent’s losses are 
linked to the extent of market cream-skimming by the entrant 
When, as in the homogeneous country, cream-skimming is limited, a 
lump-sum tax can be imposed on the entrant to finance the universal service.  But 
when this phenomenon is more significant, the lump-sum tax is ineffective and 
the tax must reduce the competitive pressure.  The coverage tax lowers the 
number of challenged routes, quite drastically in the monotone country and the 
incumbent reduces its losses.  Moreover, facing a smaller scale entrant, the 
incumbent has some freedom to raise its price.  But even taking that into account, 
prices are lower than with the ad-valorem and output taxes.  Thus the coverage 
tax is the preferred option.  In the dual case, reducing entry with a coverage tax is 
not enough to sustain USO (unless entry is completely deterred) and the regulator 
should use a mechanism that has a stronger impact on competition, by modifying 
																																																								
20 The only unanimous ranking is between the unit and the ad-valorem tax, the former dominating 
the latter (see Anderson et al., 2001 on this point).   
21 Currently, some countries are actually experiencing declines in total mail volume due to e-
substitution.   
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	price and coverage decisions.  The ad-valorem or the output tax inflates the 
entrant’s price and this leaves some freedom to the incumbent to raise its price 
too.  With both firms charging a higher price, universal service becomes 
sustainable.  Notice that in the dual country, the tax is at a level such that all 
prices are strictly higher than in the pre-FMO situation.   
The choice of an appropriate tax instrument is thus dependent on the 
country configurations.  We have paid particular attention to the asymmetry 
within a country.  More asymmetric countries, that are more prone to selective 
entry, need more distortive instruments to finance the universal service.  The 
reason is that, in these configurations, distorting the entrant’s behavior is a 
necessary condition for a sustainable USO.  The competitive pressures exerted by 
the entrant must be reduced to have a viable USO.  When competition is more 
damaging to the incumbent, the regulator must use more distortive instruments to 
finance the USO.  As a corollary, prices in a liberalized market substantially differ 
across countries.  The prices (pi, pe) corresponding to the preferred USO financing 
scheme are (0.43€, 0.32€) in the homogeneous country, (0.46€, 0.34€) in the 
monotone country and (0.51€, 0.41€) in the dual country.  These price differences 
reflect the use of more distortive tax instruments.  
To check the robustness of our welfare ranking, we have conducted 
alternative estimations with a modified cost effectiveness for the entrant.  We 
considered an entrant with a unit cost 10% or 30% lower than the incumbent 
monopolist’s (the results presented in this section are based on a 20% cost 
advantage).  With these modified cost parameters, the preferred tax in the 
homogeneous country may no longer be the entry fee.  Indeed, with a 30% cost 
advantage, aggregate profits are negative and the lump-sum fee cannot be used for 
USO financing.  With a 10% cost advantage, both firms have positive profits and 
there is no need to impose a tax to finance the USO.   Except for that, the tax 
ranking is identical.   
 
3.4 Reforming USO 
 
An alternative to the tax is to reduce the possibility of cream-skimming by having 
prices that reflect more closely the (average) costs.  Indeed, selective entry in the 
more profitable regions is exacerbated by the uniform price constraint that makes 
the low cost regions artificially profitable.  Without the uniform price constraint, 
the incumbent is able to sustain the USO without taxes but consumers that are not 
covered by the entrant face the monopoly price.   For that reason, the non-uniform 
price solution leads to a considerably lower welfare, unless some form of price 
regulation accompanies it.  With an appropriate price cap, the removal of the 
uniform price constraint is the solution that leads to the highest welfare in the 
three countries.   
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Market liberalization changes universal service financing.  The ‘old 
fashioned’ financing under monopoly uses internal cross-subsidies: profitable 
services that are sheltered from competition finance the loss-making services.  In 
a liberalized world, these internal cross-subsidies are no longer possible because 
the competitors focus only on the profit-making services leaving the unprofitable 
ones to the USP.  A universal service fund can be used to re-organize cross-
subsidies within the industry but such a fund modifies the way firms compete.  
Universal service is financed differently in a liberalized environment and the 
financing mechanism is not competitively neutral.  Pushing this logic to its end, a 
reform of the universal service financing should be accompanied by a reform in 
the definition of the universal service itself.  It may well be that, given the cost of 
the USO in a liberalized environment, the regulator wishes to modify the scope of 
the universal service.  As we have shown, relaxing the pricing constraint might be 
an appropriate alternative to the universal service fund.  Other reforms, such as 
for example a lower delivery frequency, might well be welfare improving given 
the cost of such a service in a competitive environment.  But this interesting issue 
is outside of the scope of this paper.   
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper, we have shown that the choice of an appropriate USO funding 
scheme depends on the countries’ geographical characteristics with more 
asymmetric countries requiring more distortive tax instruments.  From our 
calibrations, it appears that none of our country configurations is able to finance 
the universal service without a compensation fund.  This quite dark picture of the 
postal sector could be partially explained by the calibration hypothesis we made. 
Though we believe that the parameters chosen are plausible, we made 
assumptions that are quite unfavorable to the USP.  Especially, we considered an 
average mail volume per inhabitant, a low cost elasticity for the USP and a large 
cost advantage for the entrant.  It is indeed in those circumstances that USO 
funding will be the more problematic, and even more if the country is 
asymmetric.  Whether European countries will be in such a worst-case scenario 
after FMO is still a debatable question since competition is still at its infancy and 
postal markets are ahead of major changes.  The future of the universal service 
and its financing are in the agenda of many European countries.  In the UK for 
instance, the Hooper report (2008) reviews the option for maintaining the 
universal service in posts.  Compensation fund, public subsidies and a reform of 
the USO are all envisioned (but the report recommends a modernization of the 
USP as a precondition before any reform).  Some countries have already decided 
to install a compensation fund and, interestingly, they have adopted a different tax 
base.  Currently, most of the universal service funds exist only on paper and, to 
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	our knowledge, only Italy and Estonia have activated the compensation fund.  In 
Estonia, the contribution is proportional to the mail volume.  In Italy, the entrants’ 
contribution to the USO financing is proportional to their turnover.  The 
maximum rate is 10% and the current rate is 3%.  The Italian compensation fund 
is notably under funded and it does not cover the burden of the USO supported by 
the USP.  In France, the new postal law specifies that the contribution to the fund 
will be proportional to the number of postal items within the scope of the USO.  
The Finish system is a pay-or-play: the licensing requirements impose either a 
large coverage, close to nationwide, or the payment of a tax proportional to the 
turnover.  The tax rate depends on the density of the regions served with a 
maximal percentage of 20% for the operators that serve only the capital.   Other 
countries, for instance Norway, have decided to rely on public subsidies to finance 
the USO.  Finally, in Sweden, the pioneer country in postal market liberalization, 
the historical operator has managed to maintain and finance the universal service 
in a liberalized environment without any sort of compensating mechanism.  But, 
competition in the bulk mail segment has been accompanied by a sharp increase 
in the single-piece letter price for which the historical operator remains de facto as 
a monopolist.  Clearly enough, there are multiple solutions to maintain a universal 
service in a liberalized environment.  In this paper, we have modestly contributed 
to the debate and we have paid a particular attention to the countries’ geographical 
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